This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system, where multiple power beacons (PBs) supply power to a transmitter in order to establish a reliable communication link with multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The transmitter has to harvest radio frequency (RF) energy from multiple PBs due to the shortage of embedded power supply before establishing its secure communication. We consider two different scenarios. In the first, the PBs and the transmitter belong to the same operator, where we formulate the resource allocation problem as the minimization of the total transmit power subject to the target secure rate constraint. The solution of this problem yields both the optimal power and energy transfer time allocation. Due to the non-convexity of this problem, we propose a two-level approach, where the inner level problem can be recast as a convex optimization framework via conic convex reformulation, while the outer level problem can be handled by using one-dimensional (1D) search. The second scenario considers the case where the transmitter and the PBs belong to different service suppliers. Hence, we formulate the resource allocation problem where we consider incentives for the PBs to assist the transmitter. This leads to the formulation of a Stackelberg game for the secure wireless-powered multiantenna multicasting system. The transmitter has to pay for the energy services from these multiple PBs in order to facilitate secure communications. In this game, the transmitter and the PB are modelled as leader and follower, respectively, in which both of them try to maximize their own utility function. The closed-form Stackelberg equilibrium of the formulated game is then derived. Finally, numerical results are provided to validate our proposed schemes.