Secret sharing allows a dealer to distribute a secret among several parties such that only authorized subsets of parties, specified by a (monotone) access structure, can reconstruct the secret. Recently, Sehrawat and Desmedt (COCOON 2020) introduced hidden access structures, that remain secret until some authorized subset of parties collaborate. However, that scheme assumes semi-honest parties and only supports restricted access structures. We address these shortcomings by constructing a novel access structure hiding verifiable secret sharing scheme, that supports all monotone access structures. Our scheme is the first verifiable secret sharing scheme that guarantees verifiability even when a majority of the parties are malicious. As the building blocks of our scheme, we introduce and construct: (i) a set-system $\mathcal{H}$ with greater than $\exp\left(c\frac{2(\log h)^2}{(\log\log h)}\right)+2\exp\left(c\frac{(\log h)^2}{(\log\log h)}\right)$ subsets of a set of $h$ elements. It is defined over $\mathbb{Z}_m$, where $m$ is a non-prime-power such that the size of each set in $\mathcal{H}$ is divisible by $m$ but the sizes of their pairwise intersections are not, unless one set is a subset of another, (ii) a new variant of the learning with errors (LWE) problem, called PRIM-LWE, wherein the secret matrix can be sampled such that its determinant is a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$, where $q$ is the LWE modulus. Our scheme relies on the hardness of LWE and its maximum share size for $\ell$ parties is $(1+ o(1)) \dfrac{2^{\ell}}{\sqrt{\pi \ell/2}}(2 q^{\varrho + 0.5} + \sqrt{q} + \Theta(h))$, where $q$ is the LWE modulus and $\varrho \leq 1$ is a constant. We also discuss directions for future work to reduce the share size to: \[\leq \dfrac{1}{3} \left( (1+ o(1)) \dfrac{2^{\ell}}{\sqrt{\pi \ell/2}}(2 q^{\varrho + 0.5} + 2\sqrt{q}) \right).\]

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