Access control is a fundamental component of the design of distributed ledgers, influencing many aspects of their design, such as fairness, efficiency, traditional notions of network security, and adversarial attacks such as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In this work, we consider the security of a recently proposed access control protocol for Directed Acyclic Graph-based distributed ledgers. We present a number of attack scenarios and potential vulnerabilities of the protocol and introduce a number of additional features which enhance its resilience. Specifically, a blacklisting algorithm, which is based on a reputation-weighted threshold, is introduced to handle both spamming and multi-rate malicious attackers. The introduction of a solidification request component is also introduced to ensure the fairness and consistency of network in the presence of attacks. Finally, a timestamp component is also introduced to maintain the consistency of the network in the presence of multi-rate attackers. Simulations to illustrate the efficacy and robustness of the revised protocol are also described.