#### Stake-governed tug-of-war and the biased infinity Laplacian

##### Alan Hammond, Gábor Pete

We introduce a two-person zero-sum game that we call stake-governed tug-of-war. The game develops the classic tug-of-war random-turn game from~\cite{PSSW09}. In tug-of-war, two players compete by moving a counter along adjacent edges of a graph, each winning the right to move at a given turn according to the outcome of the flip of a fair coin; a payment is made from one player to the other when the counter reaches a boundary set on which the terminal payment value is specified. The player Mina who makes the payment seeks to minimize its mean; her opponent Maxine seeks to maximize it. The game's value is the infinity harmonic extension of the payment boundary data. In the stake-governed version, both players first receive a limited budget. At the start of each turn, each stakes an amount drawn from her present budget, and the right to move at the turn is won randomly by a player with probability equal to the ratio of her stake and the combined stake just offered. For certain graphs, we present the solution of a leisurely version of the game, in which, after stakes are bid at a turn, the upcoming move is cancelled with probability $1 - \epsilon \in (0,1)$. With the parameter $\epsilon$ small enough, and for finite trees whose leaves are the boundary set and whose payment function is the indicator on a given leaf, we determine the value of the game and the set of Nash equilibria. When the ratio of the initial fortunes of Maxine and Mina is $\lambda$, Maxine wins each turn with a probability $\tfrac{\lambda}{1+\lambda}$ under optimal play, and game value is a biased infinity harmonic function $h(\lambda,v)$; each player stakes a shared non-random proportion of her present fortune, a formula for which we give in terms of the spatial gradient and $\lambda$-derivative of $h(\lambda,v)$. We also show with some examples how the solution can differ when $\epsilon$ is one.

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